TL;DR
- The post-WWII international order is being deliberately dismantled, with U.S. military adventurism replacing diplomatic engagement across multiple theaters
- 27-28% of available U.S. forces are positioned in the Caribbean - a strategic mal-positioning when potential conflicts with Iran, Russia, and China remain unresolved
- The Trump administration is pursuing a “Latin America first” policy unprecedented in modern history, with the national security strategy dedicating four pages to the Western Hemisphere
- Europe is responding to U.S. unpredictability by accelerating defense integration, with EU Defense Commissioner proposing a 100,000-strong European army
- The rule of law is declining both internationally and domestically in tandem, a pattern consistent with imperial overreach
Introduction
Something unusual happened in the first weeks of 2026. While the world focused on rhetoric about Greenland and Panama, a former chief of staff to the U.S. Secretary of State and a former deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency were saying essentially the same thing from very different vantage points: the United States is restructuring the global order, and not in ways the foreign policy establishment anticipated.
Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, who served Colin Powell, describes it as “an unraveling of the entire world order that was set up post World War II” - one he believes is intentional. Meanwhile, analysts at CSIS note the Trump administration has positioned roughly a quarter of available naval forces in the Southern Caribbean, the largest naval buildup in that region in modern memory.
This analysis synthesizes multiple expert perspectives from January 14-16, 2026, examining what these shifts mean for global stability, European security, and the trajectory of American power.
Background
The international order established after World War II rested on several pillars: multilateral institutions, free trade agreements, alliance structures like NATO, and a rules-based framework for resolving disputes. For decades, the United States served as the guarantor of this system, even as its own interests evolved.
Three structural factors have now converged to accelerate change. First, China’s economic rise has challenged U.S. dominance in ways that free trade frameworks cannot address. Second, the Ukraine conflict has exposed the limits of NATO cohesion and the costs of extended deterrence. Third, domestic political realignment in the United States has produced administrations willing to question long-standing strategic assumptions.
The current administration has been explicit about its intentions. The December 2025 national security strategy document led with Latin America in its regional sections - unprecedented for a region typically relegated to a single page of policy consideration.
Strategic Repositioning in the Western Hemisphere
The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in the early morning hours of January 3rd, 2026 marked a dramatic escalation of U.S. intervention in Latin America. More significant than the operation itself is what it reveals about strategic priorities.
At peak deployment, approximately 20% of the U.S. Navy’s deployed fleet was positioned in the Southern Caribbean theater. This represents a fundamental reallocation of military assets at a moment when potential conflicts with near-peer adversaries remain unresolved.
The strategic logic is contested. Supporters argue this demonstrates the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine - that the Western Hemisphere falls unambiguously within the U.S. sphere of influence. Critics, including senior military analysts, describe it as “mal-positioning” given the demands of potential operations against Iran or sustained deterrence requirements in the Indo-Pacific.
The administration has staffed key positions with Latin America specialists: Secretary of State Rubio, Deputy Secretary Landau, and high-level special envoy Clavaron. This concentration of regional expertise at the cabinet level signals long-term commitment to hemispheric engagement.
What remains unclear is whether this represents strategic clarity or strategic distraction. Forces committed to Caribbean operations are forces unavailable elsewhere. If Iran becomes an active theater - a prospect considered likely by multiple analysts - the current posture creates significant constraints.
Europe’s Forced Autonomy
The most consequential second-order effect of U.S. strategic repositioning may be the acceleration of European defense integration. EU Defense Commissioner Andreas Kibilius, former Lithuanian Prime Minister, delivered a landmark speech in Sweden calling for a 100,000-strong European standing army.
This matters because of who is saying it. The Baltic states have historically been the most Atlanticist members of the EU, prioritizing NATO above EU defense initiatives. When a former Baltic leader argues for European strategic autonomy, something fundamental has shifted.
The proposal responds to a specific reality: responsibility for Ukraine has been transferred from the United States to Europe. Europeans have stepped up, but the current model - coordination without integration - has structural limits. When every European leader says essentially the same thing simultaneously, the message drowns itself out. Europe needs a singular strategic voice.
The SAFE program represents a 150 billion euro loan focused on defense procurement coordination. This addresses a persistent European weakness: fragmented defense industries producing equipment that cannot interoperate. The question is whether financial integration can proceed fast enough to create operational capability.
There are calls from Georgia Meloni and Emmanuel Macron for a European Security Council that could provide unified strategic direction. The EU is transforming from an economic project into a security actor - not by choice, but by necessity.
The Rule of Law Question
Perhaps the most concerning pattern emerging from this analysis is the parallel erosion of legal frameworks domestically and internationally. When the law disappears on the international sphere, it tends to decline domestically as well - “when the empire essentially comes home.”
The Venezuela operation, while legally justified through existing drug trafficking indictments, sets precedents for executive action that bypass traditional diplomatic processes. The question is not whether Maduro was a legitimate target under U.S. law, but what the normalization of such operations implies for the broader system.
Analysts express cautious optimism that the Venezuela intervention could lead to democratic transition - free elections in which Maria Corina Machado, Edmundo Gonzalez, and other opposition figures can compete. This optimistic scenario depends on the stabilization and recovery phases proceeding as planned before the transition phase begins.
The pessimistic scenario is that intervention without institutional follow-through creates sustained instability. The administration’s roadmap includes stabilization, economic recovery, and political transition phases - but the historical record of such sequences is mixed.
China’s Parallel Campaign
Simultaneous with U.S. strategic repositioning, China continues what former DIA Deputy Director David Shedd describes as “an enormous investment” in intelligence and influence operations against the United States.
The Ministry of State Security has doubled in size since 2013. It combines functions that in the U.S. system are distributed across the CIA, FBI, NSA, and NGA. Bureau 18, focused exclusively on the United States, represents China’s acknowledgment that this relationship has become fundamentally adversarial.
Recent cases illustrate the scope: the conviction of a Navy sailor for selling secrets to Chinese intelligence, the arrest of Chinese nationals attempting to recruit active-duty service members, PhD students smuggling pathogens into research institutions, and continued cyber operations including the Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon campaigns targeting congressional systems.
This creates a paradox for U.S. strategic planning. Resources committed to hemispheric operations are resources unavailable for China competition. The administration appears to be betting that securing the Western Hemisphere provides a stable rear area for eventual great power competition - but that calculation assumes the window for hemispheric consolidation doesn’t overlap with escalation elsewhere.
Key Insights
The Intentionality Question: Multiple sources converge on the assessment that current disruptions are deliberate rather than accidental. Whether one views this as strategic repositioning or reckless dismantlement depends on assumptions about what order serves U.S. interests.
Force Posture Reveals Priorities: The Caribbean deployment is not rhetoric - it represents real allocation decisions with real opportunity costs. This is the clearest signal of actual strategic priorities regardless of official documents.
European Autonomy Accelerates Under Pressure: The EU defense integration that decades of American urging could not produce is now happening because Europeans perceive they have no alternative. Necessity accomplishes what persuasion could not.
Domestic and International Order Are Linked: The correlation between international rule-breaking and domestic institutional stress is not coincidental. Systems that normalize exceptional measures abroad tend to normalize them at home.
Implications
Near-term (6-12 months)
The Venezuela situation will test whether the administration can execute the transition roadmap it has outlined. Success would validate the intervention; failure would create a sustained drain on attention and resources.
European defense initiatives will move from proposals to early implementation. The 100,000-strong force concept will encounter practical obstacles - command structures, procurement coordination, deployment authorities - but the political momentum is now sufficient to sustain progress.
Iran remains the wild card. Multiple analysts assess that military action is likely in 2026. The Caribbean commitment creates constraints but does not preclude operations.
Medium-term (1-3 years)
The post-WWII order’s transformation will continue regardless of which administration follows. The structural factors - China’s rise, European autonomy, U.S. domestic political realignment - are not reversible through elections.
The question is whether transformation produces a new stable equilibrium or sustained instability. Historical precedent offers examples of both: the Concert of Europe emerged from Napoleonic disruption; the interwar period failed to establish durable arrangements.
Questions for Further Exploration
- Can European defense integration proceed fast enough to provide credible deterrence before U.S. commitment further erodes?
- What happens to U.S.-China relations if the hemispheric consolidation strategy requires sustained attention that delays competitive positioning in the Indo-Pacific?
- Is the administration’s confidence in managing multiple theaters simultaneously based on capabilities the public doesn’t see, or on underestimation of potential adversaries?
Editorial Note
InsightForge approaches geopolitics from a realist perspective, emphasizing structural factors, great power dynamics, and national interests. Alternative analytical frameworks exist.
Sources: Glenn Diesen interviews with Col. Lawrence Wilkerson (cred 8/10) and Alex Krainer (cred 8/10); CSIS analysis from Max Bergman, Ryan Berg, and others (cred 8/10); CSIS interview with David Shedd (cred 8/10). Content from January 14-16, 2026.